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DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AS CATALYSTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES
GERARD GEORGE
Syracuse University
GANESH N. PRABHU
Indian Institute of Management at Bangalore
With ongoing privatization efforts in emerging economies, governments have sup-
ported developmental financial institutions (DFIs) to spur entrepreneurial activity. We
use stakeholder theory to suggest that postprivatization stakeholders differ in their
preference to seek DFI support. We then posit that national developmental priorities
influence the DFI's willingness to be involved in the governance of the privatized firm,
and we discuss implications of DFI involvement for value creation and entrepreneur-
ship in emerging economies.
In emerging economies the privatized firm is
exposed to competitive pressures in domestic
and international markets while experiencing a
decline in government resource support. To re-
main competitive, the privatized firm seeks out
new partnerships and resource bases (Uhlen-
bruck & DeCastro, 1998). Developmental finan-
cial institutions (DFIs) are quasi-governmental
organizations formed with the purpose of devel-
oping and/or rejuvenating core industries (Kane,
1975). Their birth can be attributed to govern-
ment mandates or directives through which the
government sought to promote industrial devel-
opment in core industries, such as steel, petro-
chemicals, and transportation. Although the
government is a dominant stockholder, DFIs
tend to behave as large institutional investors
with independent managerial control (Bhatt,
1993). DFIs also provide long-term capital by
disbursing loans or assuming equity positions
in a privatized firm (International Finance Cor-
poration [IFC], 2000). Given the withdrawal of
government budgetary support for the newly
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privatized firm, DFIs become important resource
bases that can potentially help the newly pri-
vatized firm to become competitive by investing
in technology, production, and infrastructure fa-
cilities. By aiding in the transition process, DFIs
can play an important role in helping newly
privatized firms develop and increase the effi-
ciency of resource utilization (Jequier & Hu,
1989). In spite of their importance, the role of
DFIs as catalysts of entrepreneurship in emerg-
ing economies has not been explained effec-
tively in management theory.
In this article we contribute to theory develop-
ment and further our understanding of DFI in-
volvement and privatization processes in two
specific ways. First, we provide a theoretical
underpinning for differences in stakeholder
preference to seek DFI resources based on the
privatization mode.' The topic of privatization
mode and its effects on governance mechanisms
is just beginning to receive attention (Djankov,
1999; European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment [EBRD], 1998; Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
1998). Recent work also indicates differing moti-
' Privatization mode refers to the process adopted by the
government to dispose its interest in a state enterprise. Pop-
ular privatization modes include partial or complete sale of
assets, transfer of partial or complete ownership to employ-
ees, transfer of partial or complete ownership to private
investors, and transfer of partial or complete ownership to a
domestic or foreign entity.
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vations of stakeholders—that is, politicians,
managers, and private investors—involved in
the privatization process (Shleifer & Vishny,
1998; Spulber, 1997). We integrate these two re-
search streams using stakeholder theory to sug-
gest that privatization modes create stakeholder
groups that differ in their preference for organ-
izational restructuring initiatives. Organiza-
tional restructuring, defined as a change in con-
stitution of business areas in which the firm
operates or a change in utilization of assets and
resources (Johnson, 1996), is likely to increase
efficiency in privatized firms (Barberis, Boycko,
Shleifer, & Tsukanova, 1996). Therefore, DFIs are
likely to initiate and support such activities in
order to make efficient use of scarce resources.
Since privatized firms that seek DFI resources
will be influenced by the DFI's inclination to
restructure the firm, not all privatized firms will
attempt to seek DFI resources. This leads to our
first theoretical question: How does the privat-
ization mode affect the privatized firm's prefer-
ence to seek DFI resources?
Second, we explain factors that influence the
level of DFI involvement in governance of the
privatized firm. Emerging economies lack the
infrastructure, such as a developed legal system
or developed capital markets, that serves as ef-
fective governance enforcement mechanisms in
advanced economies (Bhide, 1994; EBRD, 1998;
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). In fact, the bank-
ruptcy of many firms in emerging economies
(e.g., Korea and Indonesia) can be attributed to
ineffective governance mechanisms (Wolfen-
sohn, 1998). However, DFIs are not likely to be
involved with governance of all privatized firms.
We draw from literature on national develop-
mental priorities (Brahm, 1995; Francis, 1992) to
suggest conditions for DFI involvement in gov-
ernance of the privatized firm. Hence, DFI in-
volvement has more important implications
from a governance perspective than as a pure
financing vehicle for capital resources. This
suggests a second theoretical question: How
does DFI involvement enhance value creation in
privatized firms?
To address these issues, we organized the re-
mainder of the article as follows. First, we provide
some background information on the types of DFIs
and their services. Next, we develop a theoretical
rationale to address our two general questions.
Finally, we discuss the DFI's role in fostering en-
trepreneurship in emerging economies.
DHS AND THEIR SERVICES
Types of DFIs > ' >
In emerging economies a general paucity of
capital, coupled with a desire for quick returns,
makes the few venture capitalists reluctant to
tie up their limited capital in long-term projects,
especially those dealing with infrastructure de-
velopment (Krishnamachari, 1962). Over time,
DFIs have become large institutions by invest-
ing heavily in designated priority areas. As in-
vestment requirements grow, DFIs raise capital
through issuance of equity (in domestic or inter-
national markets) and create their own share-
holders, although the government continues to
have sizable equity stakes in these DFIs. DFIs
may also leverage their equity with interna-
tional borrowings, allowing them to raise sub-
stantially more capital than was accessible
through domestic capital markets and govern-
ment resources.
There are several DFIs that participate in the
privatization process of their respective coun-
tries, with nearly seventy-five DFIs in the Asia-
Pacific region (ADFIAP, 2000), seventy DFIs in
Africa, and about ninety DFIs in the Latin Amer-
ica region (International Monetary Fund [IMF],
2000). Different types of DFIs exist, but we can
distinguish between them based on geographic
scope, specialization, and scale and scope of
services offered. First, DFIs differ in their geo-
graphic scope of operations. Although most DFIs
tend to be country-specific organizations, there
are a few regional and international DFIs. For
example, the IFC is a World Bank subsidiary
and an international DFI, with investments of
$8 billion in different privatization programs
(IFC, 2000). Second, DFIs may specialize in fi-
nancing for a specific industry (e.g., agriculture)
or firm size (e.g., small businesses). Finally, DFIs
differ in the scale and scope of services offered.
For example, the Industrial Development Bank
of India (IDBI) has an asset base of $10 billion
and offers a broad scope of services, such as
identification of project ideas, preparation of pre-
liminary feasibility studies, search for manage-
rial and entrepreneurial talents, preparation of
detailed project reports, managerial, technical
and financial assistance for project implementa-
tion, critical evaluation of projects from the na-
tional point of view and finally project supervi-
sion (IDBI, 1972: 1).
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DFIs, however, may have a more focused scope
of services. For example, CSITIC, a Chinese DFI,
helps identify and provide financing for com-
mercialization of research in high-technology
projects.
DFI Services
DFIs employ a staff of bankers, investment
analysts, and advisors with contextual knowl-
edge required to operate in the local business
environment (Bhatt, 1993; Jequier & Hu, 1989). A
DFI may help in identifying emerging technolo-
gies in the home country and abroad for efficient
product or process development. In facilitating
boundary-spanning processes, the DFI plays the
roles of connector between various interested
organizations and arbitrator of disputes be-
tween participants. DFIs form regional net-
works, such as ALIDE (Latin America), AADFI
(Africa), or ADFIAP (Asia), that help disseminate
project information faster and more efficiently.
Therefore, DFIs can potentially provide valuable
advisory services to the privatized firm.
DFI financing provides the capital liquidity
that allows the firm to be competitive by making
strategic investments in developing core compe-
tencies (Kane, 1975; Pandey, 1990). All DFIs pro-
vide long-term financing, but not all offer the
substantial support services discussed. Some
DFIs offer simple financial alternatives (combi-
nations of loans), whereas others offer sophisti-
cated financial structuring alternatives (loan,
equity, debenture/preferred stock combina-
tions). Also, not all DFIs offer comprehensive
services, such as technology identification, net-
work development, and project management.
Therefore, the scale and scope of services pro-
vided by DFIs are important determinants of the
resources to which a newly privatized firm can
gain access.
STAKEHOLDER PREFERENCE FOR
RESTRUCTURING AND RESOURCE-SEEKING
BEHAVIOR
Researchers have defined privatization as
transfer of controlling interest (i.e., majority equity
ownership) from the state to private investors
(Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). This definition is
similar to that of management theorists, who de-
fine the market for corporate control as transfer-
ring of managerial control to new capital provid-
ers through acquisitions and other control transfer
mechanisms (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel,
1996). Although the intent of privatization is to
transfer ownership, such factors as political coa-
litions and capital market liquidity affect the se-
lection of privatization modes, which, in tum, re-
sults in hybrid ownership structures^ (Carlin &
Aghion, 1996). In Table 1 we summarize some of
the popular privatization modes that may lead to
different stakeholder groups with dominant equity
control of the firm.
Stakeholders have been defined as voluntary or
involuntary risk bearers, where voluntary risk
bearers have invested some form of capital (finan-
cial or human) in the organization and involuntary
risk bearers have been placed at risk as a result of
the firm's activities (Clarkson, 1994). Clarkson's
definition allows the organization to take into ac-
count stakeholders who have legitimate claims
and can influence managerial decisions (Donald-
son & Preston, 1995; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Transfer of equity controlling interest would entail
the transfer of decision-making rights to a partic-
ular stakeholder group. For the privatization
modes described in Table 1, there are four distinct
stakeholder groups who can be classified as vol-
untary risk bearers: (1) employees, (2) government,
(3) private corporations, and (4) investors through
capital markets.
Stakeholders' Preference for Restructuring
Research on the politics of privatization indi-
cates that governments and employees as
stakeholder groups have similar preference
functions (Spulber, 1997). More specifically, pol-
iticians and employees share similar ideologi-
cal platforms on labor spending and foregone
^ For example, the Estonian Privatization Agency (EPA)
favors public offering of shares of major companies that are
expected to generate public interest. Privatization through
private placement of stock usually entails a transfer of eq-
uity controlling interest—that is, greater than 50 percent of
common stock—to the private investor or corporation. The
same country, using a different privatization mode—public
auction—of two of its six biggest privatization transactions
in 1997, sold 34 percent interest in AS Estimpeks and 19.5
percent in AS Hotell Olumpia to private investors (EPA, 1998).
In these two firms private investors were still minority
shareholders, and the government retained majority equity
control in the firm. This example illustrates two scenarios of
controlling interest within the same country following dif-
ferent privatization modes (i.e., private placement and pub-
lic auction).
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profits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). That is, employ-
ees in emerging economies are likely to sacri-
fice organizational profitability in favor of con-
tinued employment and higher compensation
(Amin, 1999). Therefore, when privatization oc-
curs through distribution of common stock to
employees, the new employee owners are un-
likely to initiate restructuring that requires
employee attrition (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, &
Rapaczynski, 1997; Hansmann, 1996).
Other privatization modes (e.g., public stock
offering or private placement) may create situa-
tions in which the state continues to retain dom-
inant interests, at least in the short term (refer to
Table 1). In such cases politicians are likely to
favor the status quo, because they depend on
employees and their unions for political support
and electoral stability. Nonetheless, politicians
also might be concerned about maximizing net
social benefits, which might require supporting
organizational restructuring initiatives (Flynn,
1999). Therefore, when the state retains control-
ling interest, it is unlikely to initiate restructur-
ing but may support these initiatives if the dom-
inant stakeholder group favors such a course of
action (Frydman et al., 1997; Flynn, 1999). Privat-
ization research conducted in Russia, China,
and other emerging economies indicates that
the state, when it is a dominant stakeholder,
typically does not initiate organizational re-
structuring (Barberis et al., 1996; Broadman, 1999;
Frydman et al., 1997; Xu & Wang, 1997).
In contrast, when private corporations and pri-
vate investors are dominant stakeholder groups,
their primary motivation is to increase organi-
zational profitability and innovation (Barberis et
al., 1996). For domestic corporations the privat-
ized firm may allow access to property-based
resources and established brand image or entry
into previously regulated markets. For large in-
ternational corporations, diversification is an
important strategic alternative for continued
growth, with important consequences for inno-
vation and profitability (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ire-
land, 1994). Governments, with the hope of ac-
cessing new capital and fostering innovation,
may offer stock partnership to large interna-
tional conglomerates. When a private corpora-
tion gains controlling interest, it is likely to favor
organizational restructuring to increase utiliza-
tion of resources (Djankov, 1999). Similarly, the
stakeholder group composed of investors
through the capital markets can exercise its
ability to control the organization and its activ-
ities (Broadman, 1999; Flynn, 1999; Gedajlovic &
Shapiro, 1998).
As our arguments suggest, stakeholders differ
in their preference for organizational restructur-
ing. In Table 1 we discuss four prevalent privat-
ization modes that influence the postprivatiza-
tion ownership structure, wherein a particular
stakeholder group may emerge with dominant
equity controlling interest. For example, results
of Djankov's (1999) study of 960 privatized firms
in transition economies suggest that when the
government retained controlling interest, re-
structuring never occurred, but restructuring
was inevitable when foreign corporations held
majority controlling interest. The results, how-
ever, were mixed when employees retained con-
trolling interest. Restructuring occurred only
when employees and managers bought out the
firm through a leveraged buyout but not when it
was given free through a voucher system. When
there was a management buyout, existing em-
ployees behaved similarly to private investors,
because of their motivation to protect their
investment.
Stakeholders' Resource-Seeking Behavior
Differences in stakeholders' resource-seek-
ing behavior can be attributed to their percep-
tion of a shift in the organizational power
structure to the resource provider (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). The stakeholders also might
differ in their resource-seeking behavior with
respect to the size of their stake in the firm. For
example, as dominant stakeholders, employ-
ees have a substantial stake in the firm when
their skills are specialized and they bear exit
costs in the form of lower wages in their next
best application of their skills (Hill & Jones,
1992). Stakeholders with significant stakes
adopt different strategies to influence the be-
havior of the firm (Frooman, 1999). Therefore,
when the dominant stakeholders seek DFI re-
sources, they are acquiescing to include an-
other stakeholder into their equation of rela-
tionships that can potentially influence firm
behavior. DFIs represent dual roles of credi-
tors and stockholders. This dual role is likely
to provide them with adequate leverage to
influence behavior of the privatized firm.
Researchers have extensively documented
the outcomes of organizational restructuring
2000 George and Piabhu 625
through divestitures or acquisitions and their
effects on innovation and firm performance {Hitt
et al., 1994, 1996). Organizational restructuring
can help refocus a firm's businesses around core
capabilities by developing businesses related
to the firm's primary competence (Bowman &
Singh, 1993). DFIs as stakeholders are essen-
tially institutional investors who have the incen-
tive and power to monitor firm strategy. Institu-
tional investors can effect restructuring
initiatives that result in higher firm profitability
(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991). DFIs are likely to
make organizational restructuring a precondi-
tion to resource support in order to make produc-
tive use of scarce resources in emerging econo-
mies. From preceding arguments we also note
that the privatization mode through the transfer
of equity controlling interest creates dominant
stakeholder groups that may differ in their mo-
tivation to initiate organizational restructuring
activities. Since DFI involvement almost neces-
sarily requires restructuring, the dominant
stakeholder groups may differ in their resource-
seeking behavior, especially with regard to DFI
support (Table 1). Therefore, we offer the follow-
ing.
Proposition 1: Piivatized fiims in
which the dominant stakeholdei is
motivated to initiate oiganizational
lestiuctuiing aie moie likely to seek
DFI suppoit than piivatized fiims in
which the dominant stakeholdei
group favois the status quo.
DFI INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNANCE
In this section we draw from literature on na-
tional developmental priorities and governance
to suggest that DFIs are likely to be involved in
the governance of the privatized firm only when
these firms operate within a national priority
industry. Given the weak governance context
prevalent in emerging economies, we argue that
DFI involvement in governance would enhance
value creation.
National Developmental Priorities and DFI
Involvement
Governments have become active in their at-
tempts to intervene with an industrial policy to
foster improved outcomes for domestic firms oper-
ating within certain industrial sectors (Lee & Reid,
1991). Management scholars (e.g.. Chandler, Ama-
tori, Hikino, & Chandler, 2000; Porter, 1990) suggest
that by targeting specific industries for specializa-
tion, governments can provide and shape the com-
petitive advantages of the firms operating within
such targeted industries. For instance, Schoening,
Souder, Lee, and Cooper (1998) found evidence
that the South Korean and Taiwanese govern-
ments have played a major role in increasing their
countries' new product innovation through tax
credits, direct and indirect subsidies, and low-
interest loans, among others. By targeting and
designating national priority areas, emerging
economies are better able to focus their limited
resources in development of industries in which
they are likely to maximize economic and compet-
itive benefits (Brahm, 1995; U.S. International
Trade Commission [USITC], 1985).
Earlier in this article we suggested that DFIs
as stakeholders are likely to favor organization-
al restructuring to improve efficiency of resource
utilization. Typically, such restructuring occurs
through active corporate governance, wherein
the DFIs exercise their equity stakes or their
representation on the board of directors of these
firms. Given an upper bound to the DFI's pool of
resources, DFIs are likely to be selective in their
involvement with newly privatized firms. We
suggest that the level of DFI involvement is in-
fluenced by the DFIs' political mandate of devel-
oping priority sectors. Therefore, DFIs are likely
to be willing to expend their limited resources in
specializing and developing priority sectors. By
targeting specific industries for support, DFIs
act as policy instruments of the government in
influencing competitiveness of firms in these
industries (Bhatt, 1993; Shin, 1993). Hence, DFIs
are more likely to be active in corporate gover-
nance when the privatized firm operates within
a national priority industry—that is, high rele-
vance to DFI mandate. Based on the above ar-
guments, we posit the following.
Proposition 2a: In emerging econo-
mies the level of DFI involvement in
governance will be influenced by the
national piioiity asciibed to the indus-
try in which the fiim operates. Specif-
ically, DFIs aie likely to be actively
involved in the coipoiate governance
of the piivatized fiim when the fiim
opeiates in a high-piioiity industry.
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Governance Involvement and Value Creation
A stumbling block for private investment in
emerging economies is the absence of effective
governance mechanisms (OECD, 1998). The
weak legal systems of emerging economies may
render contracts or agreements unenforceable,
or the sluggish process delays such enforcement
to an extent that it makes such efforts costly and,
in many cases, futile (EBRD, 1998; OECD, 1998).
Hence, the weak governance context substan-
tially increases the risks faced by foreign corpo-
rations seeking partnerships in emerging econ-
omies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Luo, 1997). When
DFIs are involved in active governance of the
firm, however, investors can rely on alternate
mechanisms that are likely to be effective in
monitoring top management behavior and con-
trolling firm behavior. Effective governance sys-
tems potentially may reduce transaction costs
and curtail opportunistic behavior of the firm
(Williamson, 1985). Scholars suggest that gover-
nance and ownership systems can influence
firm performance (Zahra, 1996; Zahra & Pearce,
1989) by affecting the manager's willingness to
take risks and make investments in projects that
increase product and process innovation (Hos-
kisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1991).
Despite the globalization of product, capital,
and labor markets, countries differ markedly in
terms of the institutional arrangements regard-
ing corporate governance and the governance-
profitability relationship (Gedajlovic & Shapiro,
1998). In privatization studies of emerging econ-
omies, scholars link effective corporate gover-
nance to enhanced firm performance in postpri-
vatized firms (Xu & Wang, 1997). For example,
researchers suggest that ownership changes
from state to private investors result in im-
proved performance when private investors or
corporations own a dominant equity stake but
that performance does not improve when the
state or employees are dominant owners (Fryd-
man et al., 1997). Such performance differences
can be attributed to effective governance mech-
anisms implemented by the new owners
(Djankov, 1999). DFIs, by virtue of the firm's de-
pendence upon their resources, are likely to ex-
ert their influence to implement effective moni-
toring and incentive alignment systems.
Therefore, we suggest that the DFI's role in ac-
tive corporate governance of the privatized firm
is likely to enhance the value creation attributed
to effective governance systems.
Proposition 2b: In emerging econo-
mies the level of DFI involvement in
governance of the privatized firm will
be positively related to improved eco-
nomic performance.
IMPUCATIONS OF DH INVOLVEMENT IN
PRrVATIZATION
Our analysis and propositions provide some
unique and valuable insights into privatization
and management research in the emerging
economy context. We see several implications of
DFI involvement with privatized firms. First, we
highlight implications of DFI involvement for
research on strategic alliances and partner se-
lection. Second, we discuss some possible con-
straints of DFI involvement. Third and finally,
we consider the DFI role in the entrepreneurial
transformation of emerging economies.
Partner Selection and Risk Sharing
Our analysis has implications for the impor-
tance of institutions in partner selection and
international joint venture evaluation. Strong re-
lationships with large reputed institutions, such
as DFIs, could help develop firm legitimacy that
attracts alliance partners. The formation of
cross-border alliances is a complex phenome-
non because of differences in cultural practices
and organizational policies (Parkhe, 1993).
Proper partner selection is even more critical in
emerging economies, because multinational
corporations face the challenges of structural
reform, weak market structure, poorly specified
property rights, and institutional uncertainty
(Luo, 1997).
Although these relationships can be of value
to foreign firms by improving market expansion,
mitigating operational risk, and providing coun-
try-specific knowledge, they are fraught with
risks (Beamish, 1987). Signaling of firm legiti-
macy helps mitigate the foreign firm's concerns
about the local partner's intentions or abilities,
thereby aiding the alliance formation process
(Raiser, 1999). Also, DFIs provide much-needed
capital, in the form of debt or equity, to the
privatized firm. Our discussion suggests that
DFIs, by providing this capital, share some of
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the risks associated with large capital invest-
ment. Hence, foreign investors might perceive
less risk inherent in investing additional capital
or technology in firms that have DFI capital sup-
port and endorsement. Therefore, in future re-
search on alliance formation in the emerging
economy context, researchers could take into
account the presence of DFIs that have the po-
tential to act as catalysts for the formation of
partnerships.
DFI Involvement and Possible Constraints
We highlight positive outcomes of DFI in-
volvement in emerging economies, but such in-
volvement may not necessarily come without
drawbacks. Possible constraints of DFI involve-
ment might include such factors as slow deci-
sion making, high intrusiveness, and reduced
managerial discretion or autonomy. Also, DFIs,
being quasi-governmental organizations, also
might exhibit high levels of bureaucracy that
may, for example, affect resource allocation de-
cisions or voting patterns in corporate gover-
nance. Such areas of research, although impor-
tant to governance in emerging economies,
largely are unexplored areas of inquiry.
Also, DFI involvement could possibly alter
firm strategy. For example, issues relating
source of financing and capital structure to firm
strategy have received attention in advanced
economies (e.g., Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Mizruchi &
Stearns, 1994) but have not been addressed in
emerging economies. Potentially, there could be
vast differences in such relationships owing to
contextual differences in operating environ-
ments. Taken together, these factors could po-
tentially affect firm behavior in these econo-
mies. Therefore, constraints of DFI involvement
and its effects on privatized firm behavior po-
tentially could be another avenue for future re-
search.
DFIs and Entrepreneurial Transformation
We refer to entrepreneurial transformation as
the renewal of existing organizations and the
creation of a competitive environment in which
the organization influences the rules of compe-
tition within the industry (Kanter, 1983; Schum-
peter, 1934). In emerging economies, state-
owned enterprises earlier had assumed the task
of developing core industrial sectors because of
the absence of individual entrepreneurial ca-
pacity, the lack of capital that allowed entrepre-
neurs to enter core industries, and the entrepre-
neur's inability to manage large investments
(Krishnamachari, 1962). In the transformation of
privatized firms, DFIs play a prominent role by
providing access to resources, as well as in-
creasing organizational effectiveness by sup-
porting restructuring initiatives. In doing so,
they act as a catalyst of entrepreneurial trans-
formation by creating a competitive environ-
ment and enhancing firm value through im-
proved economic performance.
DFIs are an infrastructure component support-
ing entrepreneurial transformation (Jequier 8f
Hu, 1989; Van de Ven, 1993). We see potential
benefits in including DFIs in our research on
entrepreneurship in emerging economies. The
level of DFI activity can be measured with such
proxies as amounts of loans disbursed, number
of projects in core sectors, and number of sup-
port programs for new ventures, among others.
DFIs potentially can play an important part
in developing favorable industry structures,
as well as in increasing the level of firm com-
petitiveness. Understanding the reasons behind
regeneration of national and industry competi-
tiveness can be critical to strategic manage-
ment research (Francis, 1992). DFIs, being quasi-
government organizations, can be effective
policy instruments through which the govern-
ment can target priority industrial areas (Brahm,
1995). Creation of government-supported market
intermediaries may hold important implications
for "soft infrastructure" development (Khanna &
Palepu, 1999) and the entrepreneurial transfor-
mation of these economies.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have extended arguments
to explain stakeholder motivation to seek DFI
support and have discussed factors that influ-
ence DFI involvement in governance. We have
explained DFI support as a potential catalyst
that facilitates restructuring and improved
economic performance of newly privatized
firms. With approximately $100 billion in new
privatization programs (OECD, 1998), there is a
need to focus research on firm-level character-
istics and relationships with external organi-
zations, such as DFIs, that can make these
programs a success in fostering entrepreneur-
Academy of Management Review
ship. With the relative scarcity of private ven-
ture capital and the weakness of the banking
sector in emerging economies (EBRD, 1998),
DFIs can be a major force in the entrepreneur-
ial transformation of emerging economies. It is
likely that we may understand a lot more of
entrepreneurship as a national phenomenon
and national competitiveness of emerging
economies if we include, in our research, DFI
activity in identifying and supporting priority
industrial sectors.
REFERENCES
ADHAP. 2000. ADFIAP member banks and financial institu-
tions. http://www.adfiap.org/
Amin, M. 1999. Labor union change under the conditions of
privatization in former socialist countries. International
Journal of Management, 16: 52-56.
Barberis, N.. Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Tsukanova, N. 1996.
How does Russian privatization work? Evidence from
the Russian shops. Journal of Political Economy, 104:
764-790.
Beamish, P. W. 1987. Joint ventures in LDCs: Partner selection
and performance. Management International Review,
27: 23-37.
Bhatt, V. 1993. Development banks as catalysts for industrial
development. International Journal of Development
Banking, 11:47-61.
Bhide, A. 1994. Efficient markets, deficient governance. Har-
vard Business Review, 72(6): 128-139.
Bowman, E., & Singh, H. 1993. Corporate restructuring: Re-
configuring the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 14:
5-14.
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1996. A theory of privat-
ization. Economic Journal, 106: 309-319.
Brahm, R. 1995. National targeting policies, high technology
industries, and excessive competition. Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 16: 71-91.
Broadman, H. 1999. The Chinese state as shareholder. Fi-
nance & Development, 36(3): 1-7.
Carlin, W., & Aghion, P. 1996. Restructuring outcomes and
the evolution of ownership patterns in Central and East-
ern Europe. Economics of Transition, 4: 371-388.
Chaganti, R., & Damanpour, F. 1991. Institutional ownership,
capital structure, and firm performance. Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 12: 479-491.
Chandler, A. D., Amatori, F., Hikino, T., & Chandler, A. D., Jr.
2000. Big business and (he wealth of nations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Clarkson, M. 1994. A risk based model of stakeholder theory.
Paper presented at the 2nd Toronto conference on stake-
holder theory. Centre for Corporate Social Performance
& Ethics, University of Toronto.
Djankov, S. 1999. Ownership structure and enterprise re-
structuring in six newly independent states. Compara-
tive Economic Studies, 41: 75-95.
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of
the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications.
Academy of Management Review, 20: 65-91.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
1998. Transition report 1998: Financial sector in transi-
tion. London: EBRD.
Estonian Privatization Agency (EPA). 1998. Estonian privat-
ization agency, http://www.eea.ee/eng97.htm
Flynn, N. 1999. Miracle to meltdown in Asia. London: Oxford
University Press.
Francis, A. 1992. The process of national and industrial re-
generation and competitiveness. Strategic Management
Journal, 13: 61-78.
Frooman, J. 1999. Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy
of Management Review, 24: 206-221.
Frydman, R., Gray, C. W., Hessel, M., & Rapaczynski, A. 1997.
Private ownership and corporate performance: Some
lessons from transition economies. Policy research paper
No. 1830. Washington. DC: World Bank.
Gedajlovic, E. R., & Shapiro, D. M. 1998. Management and
ownership effects: Evidence from five countries. Strate-
gic Management Journal, 19: 533-553.
Hansmann, H. 1996. The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hill, C. W., & Jones, T. M. 1992. Stakeholder-agency theory.
Journal of Management Studies, 29: 131-154.
Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R., 8E Ireland, D. 1994. A mid-range theory
of the interactive effects of international and product
diversification on innovation and performance. Journal
of Management, 20: 297-326.
Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R., Johnson, R., & Moesel, D. 1996. The
market for corporate control and firm innovation. Acad-
emy of Management Journal, 39: 1084-1119.
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., & Hill, C. W. 1991. Managerial
risk taking in diversified firms: An evolutionary perspec-
tive. Organization Science, 2: 296-313.
Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). 1972. Annual
report 1971-72. Bombay: IDBI.
International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2000. IFC privatiza-
tion advisory services, http://wvrw.ifc.org/
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2000. Latin America as-
sociation of DFIs. http://www.imf.org/
Jequier, N., & Hu, Y. 1989. Banking and the promotion of
technological development. New Delhi: Macmillan.
Johnson, R. A. 1996. Antecedents and outcomes of corporate
refocusing. Journal of Management, 22: 439-484.
Kane, J. 1975. Development banJcing: An economic appraisal.
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Kanter, R. 1983. The change masters: Innovation and entre-
preneurship in the American corporation. New York: Si-
mon and Schuster.
2000 George and Piabhu
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 1997. Why fcx:used strategies may
be wrong in emerging economies. Harvard Business Re-
view, 75(4): 41-51.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 1999. The right way to restructure
conglomerates in emerging markets. Harvard Business
Review, 77(4); 125-134.
Krishnamachari, V. T. 1962. Fundamentals of planning in
India. Bombay: Orient Longman.
Kochhar, R., & Hitt, M. A. 1998. Linking corporate strategy to
capital structure: Diversification strategy, type, and
source oi financing. Strategic Managrement Journal,
19: 601-610.
Lee, T. H., & Reid, P. B. 1991. National interests in an age of
global technology. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press.
Luo, Y. 1997. Partner selection and venturing success: The
case of joint ventures with firms in People's Republic of
China. Organization Science, 8: 648-662.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory
of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the
principle of who and what really counts. Academy of
Management Review, 22: 853-886.
Mizruchi, M. S., & Stearns, L. B. 1994. A longitudinal study of
borrowing by large American corporations. Administra-
tive Science Quarteriy, 39: 118-140.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 1998. Corporate governance, state-owned enter-
prises and privatisation in OECD countries. Paris: OECD.
Pandey, I. M. 1990. Development finance management in
LDCs: The Indian experience. Research in Third World
Accounting, 1: 171-194.
Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theo-
retic and transaction cost examination of interfirm coop-
eration. Academy of Management Joumal 36: 794-829.
Pfeffer, ]., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of
organizations. New York: Harper & Row.
Porter, M. E. 1990. Competitive advantage of nations. New
York: Free Press.
Raiser, M. 1999. Trust in transition. Working paper No. 39.
London: EBPID.
Schoening, N., Souder, W., Lee, J., & Cooper, R. 1998. The
influence of government science and technology poli-
cies on new product development in the USA, UK, South
Korea, and Taiwan, /ntemational Joumal of Technology
Management. 15: 821-835.
Schumpeter, I. 1934. The theory of economic development.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shin, R. W. 1993. The role of industrial policy agents: A study
of a Korean intermediate organisation as a policy net-
work, international Review of Administrative Sciences,
59: 15-30.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1998. The grabbing hand. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spulber, N. 1997. Redefining the state: Privatization and wel-
fare reform in industrial and transitionai economies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Uhlenbruck. N., & De Castro, J. 1998. Privatization from the
acquirer's perspective: A mergers and acquisition's
based framework. Joumal of Management Studies, 35:
819-640.
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 1985. Foreign
industrial targeting and its effect on CIS industries.
Phase III: Brazil. Canada, the Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Taiwan. USITC publication No. 1632. Washington, DC:
USITC.
Van de Ven, A. H. 1993. The development of an infrastructure
for entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing,
8:211-230.
Williamson, O. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism.
New York: Free Press.
Wolfensohn, J. 1998. A battle for corporate honesty: The world
in 1999. London: The Economist Group.
Xu, X., & Wang, Y. 1997. Ownership structure, corporate gov-
ernance, and firm performance: The case of Chinese
stock companies. Policy research paper No. 1794. Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank.
Zahra, S. 1996. Governance, ownership, and corporate entre-
preneurship: The moderating impact of technological
opportunities. Academy of Management Joumal, 39:
1713-1735.
Zahra, S., & Pearce, J. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate
financial performance: A review and integrative model.
Joumal of Management, 15: 291-334.
Gerard George is an assistant professor of strategy and entrepreneurship at Syracuse
University. He received his Ph.D. from Virginia Commonwealth University. His re-
search interests include the study of contextual and structural factors affecting inno-
vation, entrepreneurship, and performance in high-technology firms.
Ganesh N. Prabhu is an assistant professor of strategy at the Indian Institute oJ
Management at Bangalore. He received his Ph.D. from the Indian Institute of Man-
agement at Ahmedabad. His research interests include the study of product develop-
ment, technology finance, entrepreneurship, and corporate social entrepreneurship in
the emerging economy context.
